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Abstract
This paper presents a search model with heterogeneous workers, social networks and
endogenous search intensity. There are three job search channels available to the unem-
ployed: costly formal applications and two costless informal channels - through family and
professional networks. The gain from being employed is increasing in the productivity, so
the lowest motivation for preparing formal applications is proved to be among the least
productive worker types. We assume that professional contacts exhibit a strong degree of
homophily, thus it is profitable for firms to direct their network search towards the more
productive incumbent employees. So the probability of a professional referral is increasing in
the productivity of the worker, which mitigates the incentives to use the formal channel of
search. Therefore, the model predicts that workers in the right (left) tail of the productivity
distribution have the highest propensity of finding a job with a help of professional (family)
contacts, whereas the formal channel of search is mostly utilized by workers in the middle
range of the distribution. This explains the U-shaped referral hiring pattern in the model.
The endogenous sorting of workers across channels also implies that professional (family)
referrals are associated with wage premiums (penalties) compared to the formal channel of
search. The average effect of referrals on wages is, however, ambiguous and depends on the
relative proportions of high and low productivity types in the population. These findings help
to explain the contradicting empirical evidence concerning the effect of referrals on wages.
Keywords: endogenous search intensity, family contacts, professional networks, U-shape,
referral puzzle, wage premiums and penalties
JEL Classification: J23, J31, J38, J64
∗Corresponding author. Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, 33501 Bielefeld, Germany.
Email: ystupnytska@uni-bielefeld.de. Phone: +4917699600132
†Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, 33501 Bielefeld, Germany. Email:
azaharieva@wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de
1
1 Introduction
The purpose of this article is to develop a labour market matching model with heterogeneous
workers, social networks and referrals. We investigate which worker groups are more likely to use
referrals in the job search process and focus on the effect of referrals on wages. Most empirical
studies generally agree that 30 - 60% of new hires find jobs through personal contacts. However,
there is no agreement in this literature concerning the effect of referrals on wages. Whereas some
authors argue that the informal channel of search leads to wage penalties for workers, others
emphasize the importance of networks in the creation of good matches, associated with wage
premiums1. This contradicting empirical evidence, which can be well described as a ”referral
puzzle”, is summarized in Pelizzari (2010) who writes that ”... in the European Union premiums
and penalties to finding jobs through personal contacts are equally frequent and are of about
the same size”. To shed some light on this issue from a theoretical perspective we suggest to
distinguish between the two types of social contacts – family and professional ties – and allow
for the endogenous search intensity of workers and firms.
The ingredients of the model are as follows. Firms are homogeneous at the stage of a
vacancy, but workers differ in their productivity which we also interpret as a level of skills or
ability. There are two types of social contacts. Family contacts are exogenous in the model and
serve as a residual method of search. In addition, every worker has a fixed number of professional
contacts2. Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004) report that acquired social contacts develop along
dimensions such as race, ethnicity, religious affiliation and education. Therefore, in our model
we assume a strong degree of network homophily along the productivity or the skill dimension.
Thus, the job-finding rate through the network of professional contacts is skill-specific. In this
setup, we distinguish between the three job search channels: formal applications to posted
vacancies and two informal channels - through family and professional networks. Both informal
channels of search are costless for workers, but preparing a formal application is associated with
a positive effort cost. Moreover, through the endogenous group-specific advertising intensity
firms can direct their network search towards particular groups of incumbent employees. This
contrasts with the formal search channel, which is random and undirected.
There are two key predictions of the model which can be described in the following way:
• The model exhibits a strong U-shape referral hiring pattern: workers in the right (left) tail
of the productivity distribution have the highest propensity of finding a job with a help of
professional (family) contacts, whereas the formal channel of search is mostly utilized by
workers in the middle range of the distribution;
• When the two types of social contacts are separated, family contacts are associated with
wage penalties, whereas referrals from professional contacts are associated with wage pre-
miums. The average effect of referrals on wages is ambiguous and depends on the relative
proportions of high and low productivity workers in the population.
1Wage penalties are reported in Bentolila, Michelacci and Suarez (2010), Delattre and Sabatier (2007), Pista-
ferri (1999) and Addison and Portugal (2002). Wage premiums are supported by Staiger (1990), Simon and
Warner (1992), Granovetter (1995) and Margolis and Simonnet (2003).
2The importance of relatives for job search is reported by Corac and Piraino (2011) and Kramarz and
Nordstrom-Skans (2011). For the role of former co-workers see Cingano and Rosolia (2012) and Glitz (2013).
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To the best of our knowledge there are no other studies that can generate these two predictions
in a unified theoretical framework. First, we explain the mechanism which is generating the
U-shape. Every wage is an outcome of bargaining between the firm and the worker. Therefore,
wages are increasing in the productivity, which is observable to the firm. With respect to
the formal search channel, unemployed workers trade off the cost and the gain of effort, so the
optimal search intensity is increasing in the productivity of the worker. Thus the least productive
group of workers has a lowest job-finding rate associated with a formal channel. In addition, the
probability of getting a job via professional referrals is also low for these workers due to a larger
share of unemployed contacts in their networks. This latter finding is explained by the fact that
the equilibrium unemployment rate is decreasing with a productivity of the worker. Low types
are then relying on their family to find a job, which is a method of last resort in the model.
Another implication of bargaining is that firms’ profits are increasing in the productivity
of the hired applicant. As the labour market exhibits a strong degree of skill homophily, firms
correctly anticipate a high productivity applicant if they approach an incumbent employee of
the same type. Such a behavior of firms is based on the belief that people tend to refer others
who are similar to themselves (Saloner, 1985; Montgomery, 1991; Galenianos, 2012). Since the
advertising effort of firms is group-specific and endogenous, it is optimal for them to direct
their search at incumbent workers of higher types. For unemployed workers this means that
the job-finding rate through the network of professional contacts is increasing in the worker’s
type. So the formal channel of search is becoming less relevant for the more productive groups
of applicants and is mostly utilized by workers in the middle range of the distribution. This
explains the U-shape of the referral hiring pattern in the model. Specifically, in a benchmark
calibration of the model, the fraction of workers relying on referrals falls down from 100% to
38% in the middle of the distribution and rises again to 67% for the most productive workers.
Second, we analyze the effect of referrals on wages. As low productivity types are more likely
to rely on family contacts, the equilibrium wage distribution of workers who used this channel is
first order stochastically dominated by the distribution of workers who used a formal method. So
the model predicts wage penalties associated with family contacts. In the benchmark calibration
of the model the penalty is equal to 6%. High productivity workers are more likely to rely on
professional contacts. Thus the equilibrium earnings distribution corresponding to this channel
first order stochastically dominates the distribution of workers who used a formal method. Hence
the network of professional contacts is associated with wage premiums. In the benchmark
calibration of the model the premium is equal to 10%. Intuitively, wage penalties/premiums
arise due to the self-selection of workers into a specific method of search and are robust to
different shapes of the skill/productivity distribution. This is different for the average effect of
referrals on wages. To illustrate this result we perform comparative statics analysis with respect
to the shift parameter of the skill distribution. Then the average wage effect of referrals is
negative (positive) in a labour market with a large fraction of low (high) types.
Next, we review the empirical support of these predictions. In a recent paper Brown et al.
(2012) estimate the relationship between the educational level and the probability of getting
a job offer. First they find that referrals have a significantly greater impact on the overall
probability of offer receipt for positions with lower education requirements. This is true for
high school diplomas and associate’s degrees. At the same time they report that referrals have
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a significantly larger positive impact on the probability of being interviewed for positions with
a graduate rather than college degree requirement. The authors conclude that referral effects
on hiring have a significant U-shaped relationship with a skill level in the United States. This
finding is also supported for the Netherlands in an earlier paper by Boxman et al. (1991), which
was the first study to make this observation.
The second prediction of our model is supported by Capellari and Tatsiramos (2013) for
the United Kingdom and Meliciani and Radicchia (2011) for Italy. Specifically, Capellari and
Tatsiramos (2013) report that high skilled workers with a better network quality of non-relatives
experience wage premiums in the British labour market. In contrast, low skilled workers with a
better network quality of relatives are more likely to experience a wage penalty associated with
a referral. Likewise, empirical evidence presented in Meliciani and Radicchia (2011) suggests
that workers entering the labour market via professional contacts enjoy a wage bonus, whereas
those recruited via referrals from family and close friends receive on average lower wages. For
Italy a similar result is also reported in an earlier study by Sylos Labini (2004). Some indirect
evidence in favor of our model is also provided by Kramarz and Nordstrom-Skans (2011) and
Hensvik and Nordstrom-Skans (2013) for Sweden. For example, the former study finds that
school graduates of lower ability are more likely to find a job through their parents but with a
wage penalty. In contrast, Hensvik and Nordstrom-Skans (2013) report that incumbent workers
of high ability (test score) are more likely to be linked to entering workers. Furthemore, the
abilities of incumbent workers are reflected in the higher starting wages of linked entrants.
Finally, we consider the overall effect of referrals on wages without separating into family and
professional contacts. Our model predicts that the average effect is positive if the proportion
of high productivity workers in the population is relatively high, overwise it is negative. This
finding may serve as an explanation of the mixed empirical evidence on the average wage effect
of referrals. For example, Staiger (1990), Simon and Warner (1992) and Granovetter (1995)
report that referrals are associated with wage premiums in the United States. The hypothesis
of wage premiums is also supported by Margolis and Simonnet (2003) and Goos and Salomons
(2007) for France and the United Kingdom. In contrast, Bentolila, Michelacci and Suarez (2010)
report wage penalties in the United States and the European Union. This result is supported
by Delattre and Sabatier (2007), Pistaferri (1999) as well as Addison and Portugal (2002) for
France, Italy and Portugal respectively.
Apart from empirics, our study is also related to a number of theoretical papers analyzing
the role of social networks. Early economic studies on social contacts include Simon and Warner
(1992), Montgomery (1991, 1992, 1994) and Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994). Both Simon and
Warner (1992) and Montgomery (1991) emphasize that referrals reveal the quality of the match
to the employer and therefore should have a positive effect on wages. This result is similar to
the positive wage effect of professional referrals in our model, however the possibility to rely on
family contacts is not included in the early studies. The first and only paper where both types
of contacts – family and professional – are explicitly included in a theoretical model is a study
by Sylos Labini (2004). This paper shows that workers who find their job through professional
referrals earn on average higher wages, whereas workers who are recommended by their relatives
earn lower wages. This finding is inline with the second prediction of our model, but it does not
generate the first prediction of the U-shape referral hiring pattern.
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Recent theoretical studies generating wage premiums associated with referrals include Kugler
(2003), Ioannides and Soetevent (2006) and Galenianos (2012). Specifically, Kugler (2003) finds
that the benefit of using referrals for firms is that they lower monitoring costs, because workers
can exert peer pressure on coworkers. As a result, firms relying on referrals find it cheaper
to elicit effort by paying efficiency wages than firms using formal hiring methods. Ioannides
and Soetevent (2006) support this result by showing that better connected workers experience
lower unemployment rates and receive higher wages. Our model also has the property that the
proportion of unemployed workers in the network of contacts is decreasing with the producitivity.
Moreover, this feedback effect is reinforcing the fact that high productivity workers are more
likely to rely on the network of professional contacts when searching for jobs. However, our
model also allows for the possibility to get help from family contacts which is not a subject of
the aforementioned research studies.
The group of papers that can generate wage penalties in a theoretical framework includes
Bentolila et al. (2010) as well as Ponzo and Scoppa (2010). Ponzo and Scoppa (2010) argue
that recruiters may favor low ability family ties over more talented applicants. This is the idea
of favoritism in the recruiting process. Bentolila et al. (2010) find that social contacts can
generate a mismatch between occupational choices and productive advantages of workers. This
is particularly true for workers who failed to find a job in their occupation and followed a recom-
mendation of a close family member. Horvath (2013) extends the mismatch result of Bentolila
et al. (2010). As the probability that ties connect similar agents (homophily) increases, the
mismatch level decreases in his model. Moreover, if this probability is suciently high, networks
provide good matches at higher rate upon arrival than the formal market. Therefore, referrals
can generate wage premiums if the homophily level in the society is high. Otherwise, if social
contacts are strongly heterogeneous, the effect of referrals on wages may be negative due to a
stronger mismatch between the skill of the worker and the type of the job.
Other theoretical papers which can explain wage premiums/penalties depending on the pa-
rameters of the labour market are Sylos-Labini (2004), Tumen (2013) and Zaharieva (2012).
Tumen (2013) considers a population of workers heterogeneous with respect to the cost of main-
taining connections. In his model well integrated workers with low costs have higher reservation
wages and are able to bargain higher wages. Conversely, workers with higher costs accept wages
below the market level. Zaharieva (2012) investigates the role of referrals in a matching model
with on-the-job search. On the one hand, in her model better connected workers bargain higher
wages for a given level of job-related productivity. This is the positive effect of outside opportu-
nities on wages. On the other hand, employees rationally accept job offers from more productive
employers and forward other offers to the unemployed contacts. Therefore, job offers transmitted
through social contacts are biased in the direction of less productive employers. This selection
mechanism can generate a negative effect of referrals on wages. To sum up, both papers by Tu-
men (2013) and Zaharieva (2012) can generate wage penalties or premiums in wages associated
with social contacts, however, in each paper the mechanism is different from the present study.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains notation and the general economic
environment. In section 3 we investigate the decisions of workers and firms and explain their
choice of the search intensity. Section 4 illustrates our theoretical results by means of a numerical
example, while section 5 concludes the paper.
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2 Labour market modeling framework
The labour market is characterized by the following properties. There is a continuum of infinitely
lived risk neutral workers and firms discounting future at a common discount rate r. Firms are
homogeneous, while workers have heterogeneous skills and abilities. Worker’s ability and skills
are reflected in his/her productivity yi, i = 1..p which follows a discrete probability distribution
fi, such that
∑p
i=1 fi = 1. Workers are perfectly informed about their productivity yi, while
firms with open vacancies are aware of the productivity distribution fi, ∀i = 1..p. At the same
time firms learn the exact productivity of the worker upon the match, so there is no asymmetric
information in the model. The highest productivity yp is set to 1, while the lowest productivity
y1 is equal to the unemployment benefit b.
Every worker can be either employed and producing output yi or unemployed and searching
for a job. Let ui denote the mass of unemployed workers with productivity yi and ei – the mass of
corresponding employees, so that ei + ui = fi, since the total measure of workers is normalized
to 1. There are three search channels in the labour market. First, unemployed workers can
find a job by sending regular applications to open vacancies, this is the formal channel of job
search with an endogenous job-finding rate φ(s). Variable s is the individual search effort of
workers and may differ across agents belonging to different productivity groups, i.e. si. The
formal channel of search is costly in terms of effort, since it requires preparing and sending job
applications. However, a more intensive job search is associated with a higher probability of
finding employment. Let C(s) = s2/c denote the effort cost function, which is identical for all
workers in the market.
Further, let all workers have an equal number of professional contacts n > 0. Employed
workers provide referrals and transmit vacancy information to the unemployed members of
their network, this is the second channel of job search. To simplify the model we assume
that professional contacts are only formed among workers with the same productivity level yi.
Therefore, the job-finding rate through the network of professional contacts is skill-specific and
is denoted by λi. Empirical support for this assumption comes from the observation of strong
homophily in social networks reported in Rivera, Soderstrom and Uzzi (2010). In addition,
professional networks are largely composed of former coworkers, therefore these contacts are
specific to a particular skill-group. Finally, λ0 is a constant probability of hearing about a job
from family members which is a third search channel in the model. Job referrals from professional
contacts and family are the informal methods of search and are costless for workers.
Firms are free to enter the labour market by opening a new vacancy. Open vacancies are
associated with a flow cost z on the side of the firm which can be understood as a cost of
capital depreciation as well as expenses from hiring and interviewing activities. Formal matching
between unemployed workers and vacancies is random and discussed below. To model the process
of network matching we extend the approach of Cahuc and Fontaine (2009) and assume that
firms make a random draw from the pool of incumbent employees with an advertising intensity
a per unit time. However, in our model the advertising intensity a is endogenous and can be
specific to a given group of employees, i.e. ai. Intuitively, ai is an effort level with which the
manager of an open vacancy is addressing an incumbent employee of type i to refer one of his/her
contacts. This extension allows firms to direct their search more intensively towards the more
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productive group of workers. The advertising search intensity a is costly for firms with a cost
function K(a) = a2/k. Note that the advertising intensity ai is chosen after the match with an
employee and so the cost K(ai) is unrelated to the cost K(aj) for i 6= j. If the job position
is filled with a worker, the firm obtains a flow profit yi − wi, where the wage wi is bargained
between the firm and the worker upon hiring. We use the Nash bargaining rule to determine
wages. Every filled job can be destroyed for exogenous reasons at rate δ.
Let m(x, v) denote a matching function between workers and firms, where v is the number of
open vacancies and x is the number of searching workers in efficiency units (either unemployed
or employed, transmitting job offers to their unemployed contacts). Following the approach of
Gautier et al. (2010) we assume that the matching technology is quadratic, that is m(x, v) = xv.
This approach has been frequently used in the search literature, for example, Teulings and
Gautier (2004) provide a number of explanations why this technology may be the most adequate
assumption in a model with worker heterogeneity. The main reason is that this technology avoids
congestion externalities between different worker types and jobs.
Consider matching between unemployed workers and open vacancies. The total number of
searching unemployed workers weighted by their search intensity is given by x =
∑
siui, so
the number of contacts created through the formal method of search is v
∑
siui. However,
only proportion siui/
∑
siui of these contacts are the matches between open vacancies and
unemployed workers of type yi. Therefore the number of matches between open vacancies and
unemployed workers of type yi is given by:
v
∑
siui · siui∑
siui
= vsiui
This means that the job-finding rate through the formal channel of search is equal to φi ≡ φ(si) =
vsiui/ui = vsi and is increasing in the total number of vacancies v and the individual search
intensity of unemployed workers si. In addition, from the perspective of firms, the probability
of filling a job through the formal channel with a worker of type yi is φiui/v = siui.
Next consider matching between employed workers and open vacancies. The total number
of employees in efficiency units is given by x =
∑
aiei, so the number of contacts between
vacancies and employees with productivity yi is equal to v
∑
aiei. However, only a fraction
aiei/
∑
aiei of these contacts are the matches between open vacancies and employees of type yi.
Every contacted employed worker transmits vacancy information to exactly one randomly chosen
unemployed social contact out of a pool of n contacts. Here we assume that job information is
only transmitted to the direct social links, so the job offer is lost if all n contacts are employed.
The probability of being employed for an arbitrary worker of type yi is equal to 1−µi, where µi ≡
ui/fi is the unemployment rate in a group of workers with productivity yi. So the probability
that all n contacts of the employee are also employed is equal to (1−µi)n. This means that the
number of matches between vacancies and unemployed workers of type yi through the network
of contacts is given by:
v
∑
aiei · aiei∑
aiei
· [1− (1− µi)n] = vaiei[1− (1− µi)n]
where expression in the square bracket is the probability of having at least one unemployed
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contact out of n. The individual job-finding rate through the first informal search channel
(professional contacts) is then equal to:
λi = vai
ei
ui
[1− (1− µi)n] = vai 1− µi
µi
[1− (1− µi)n]
Note that λi is increasing in the number of vacancies v and the number of social contacts n.
Moreover, a more intensive search by firms directed at workers of type yi, that is a higher
ai, is raising the probability of finding a job for an unemployed worker of this type. From
the perspective of firms, the flow probability of filling a job with a professional contact of an
incumbent employee of type yi is equal to λiui/v = aiei[1− (1− µi)n].
3 Analysis of the model
3.1 Workers and their choice of search effort
Let Ui (Wi) denote the present value of being unemployed (employed) for the worker with
productivity yi, i = 1..p. The asset value of unemployed workers of type yi is given by:
rUi = b+ (λ0 + λi)(Wi − Ui) + vmax
s
[s(Wi − Ui)− 1
c
s2] (1)
and reflects simultaneous availability of the three job search channels discussed above. The
rent from employment is independent of the search channel and is denoted by Ri ≡ (Wi − Ui).
Workers choose costly effort si to maximize the present value of unemployment Ui, therefore the
optimal level of search effort si obtains at the point where the marginal gain (Wi − Ui) is equal
to the marginal cost C ′(s):
si = 0.5c(Wi − Ui) = 0.5cRi
Therefore, the asset value of unemployment can be rewritten as:
rUi = b+ (λ0 + λi)Ri + 0.25cvR
2
i (2)
Further, the asset value of employed workers of type yi is given by:
rWi = wi − δ(Wi − Ui) (3)
and so the worker rent from employment is equal to the discounted net present value of earnings:
Ri = (wi− rUi)/(r+ δ). Combining this and equation (2) allows us to derive the optimal search
effort si ≡ s(λi, wi). These results are summarized in Lemma 1:
Lemma 1: Consider workers with productivity yi. The optimal job-finding rate φ(si) = vsi
through the formal channel of search is given by:
vsi =
√
(r + δ + λ0 + λi)2 + (wi − b)cv − (r + δ + λ0 + λi) (4)
The optimal search intensity s(λi, wi) is increasing in the wage wi but decreasing in λi, which is
a job-finding rate through professional contacts.
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Proof: Appendix I.
Lemma 1 shows that a higher wage wi would motivate workers to exert more effort when
applying for jobs. On the contrary, a higher job-finding rate through professional contacts λi
improves the outside opportunities of workers, so the total rent from a job Ri is reduced. A
lower rent then has a disincentive effect on the intensity of job search.
3.2 Firms and the wage determination
From the perspective of firms, let Ji be the asset value of a job, filled with a worker of type yi,
and V be the present value of the open vacancy. We will come back to the determination of V
in section 3.5. Once matched firms observe the productivity of the applicant, so Ji is given by:
rJi = yi − wi − δ(Ji − V ) (5)
The equilibrium wages are determined by means of Nash bargaining with a disagreement-while-
bargaining state UDi for type yi worker and with α ∈ (0, 1) being the workers’ bargaining power,
for example, as in Gautier (2002) and Hall and Milgrom (2008). This approach is close to the
bargaining model with a risk of a negotiation breakdown by Binmore et al. (1986) and allows to
simplify the model, while not influencing qualitatively the results. An unemployed worker gets
a present value UDi during the disagreement time, while the employer obtains a present value
V Di . We assume that during the time of negotiation neither the worker nor the firm continue
searching for other partners. This is intuitive since there are no reasons for agents to exert costly
search effort when they are already in the process of bargaining with a prospective partner. This
means that neither the worker nor the firm pays the search cost during the period of negotiation,
however, the worker still receives the unemployment benefit from the state. Thus, UDi and V
D
i
can be written as:
rUDi = b+ δ(Ui − UDi ) rV Di = δ(V − V Di )
These equations imply that vacancies have the same probability δ of being destroyed during the
bargaining as do existing jobs. Moreover, if the bargaining process breaks down for an exogenous
reason, the worker becomes unemployed with a present value Ui and the position remains vacant
with a present value V . The solution is the wage wi maximizing the Nash objective function
(Wi − UDi )α(Ji − V Di )1−α which can be written as:
max
wi
(wi + δUi
r + δ
− b+ δUi
r + δ
)α(yi − wi + δV
r + δ
− δV
r + δ
)1−α ⇒ wi = αyi + (1− α)b
This maximization problem shows that the wage is a weighted average between the unemploy-
ment benefit b and the productivity yi. Therefore, wages are heterogeneous in the economy
and resemble the productivity distribution in the population of workers. Let gi denote the
equilibrium distribution of wages, such that
∑
gi = 1. It is then given by:
gi =
ei
e
=
fi(1− µi)∑
fi(1− µi) =
fi(1− µi)
1−∑ fiµi
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where e = 1 −∑ fiµi is the equilibrium employment rate in the economy. Intuitively, if the
employment rate of some worker group is smaller than the average, i.e. (1− µi) < (1−
∑
fiµi),
then this group is underrepresented in the earnings distribution compared to the initial produc-
tivity density fi. The opposite holds when the employment rate of some worker group is larger
than the average, so this group is overrepresented.
3.3 Type-specific unemployment rates
Consider workers with productivity yi. The unemployment rate µi = ui/fi can be found from
the steady-state equation for unemployed workers. It can be written as:
0 = u˙i = δ(fi − ui)− (λ0 + λi + siv)ui (6)
and reflects the fact that the inflow into and the outflow out of unemployment are equalized in
the steady state. Thus, the equilibrium unemployment rate µi is equal to:
µi =
δ
λ0 + siv + λi + δ
=
δ√
(δ + λ0 + λi)2 + α(yi − b)cv
⇒ µi = µ(λi, yi) (7)
where the second equality is obtained for the limiting case r → 0 to simplify the exposition.
Hence the equilibrium unemployment rate can be expressed as a function of the job-finding rate
λi and the productivity yi. Next, consider a partial relationship between µi and λi for a fixed
productivity yi. A higher probability of finding a job through professional contacts (that is a
higher λi), has an indirect disincentive effect on the search intensity s(λi, yi). Consequently, a
lower level of search effort through the formal channel raises the equilibrium unemployment rate
µi. This is an indirect effect which is operating through the outside opportunities of workers. At
the same time a higher λi reduces the unemployment rate µi. This is a direct effect since more
unemployed workers find jobs by means of referrals. Equation (7) shows that the direct effect
is dominating and describes a negative relationship between the unemployment rate µi and the
job-finding rate through professional contacts λi:
∂µ(λi, yi)
∂λi
< 0 lim
λi→0
µi =
δ√
(δ + λ0)2 + α(yi − b)cv
≡ µ¯i > 0 lim
λi→∞
µi = 0
This is illustrated in figure 1, where µ¯i denotes the upper limit of the unemployment rate µi for
a given fixed level of yi. The corresponding curve is denoted by (UC).
Further, recall from section 2 that the job-finding rate by means of referrals λi depends on
the unemployment rate in the network µi. In particular, it holds that:
λi = vai
1− µi
µi
[1− (1− µi)n] ⇒ λi = λ(µi, ai) (8)
If more workers of a given type are employed (that is a lower µi) the possibilities for firms
to communicate with this group of employees arise more frequently. And hence the contact
rate between firms and unemployed workers of type yi is increased. But on the other hand, a
lower unemployment rate µi implies a lower number of unemployed contacts in the network and
therefore, a lower probability that the contacted employee will recommend someone for a job
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Figure 1: Intersection between µ(λ, y) and λ(µ, a) for a given advertising intensity a and a given
productivity y. Left panel: changes in λ(µ, a) and µ(λ, y) given a positive shift in y. Right
panel: changes in λ(µ, a) and µ(λ, y) given a positive shift in a.
[1− (1−µi)n]. Lemma 2 shows that the indirect network effect is dominated by the direct effect
of a higher contact rate between firms and unemployed workers and so equation (8) describes a
negative relationship between variables λi and µi. The corresponding curve is denoted by (NC).
Lemma 2: For a given advertising intensity ai, a lower unemployment rate µi in a group
of workers with productivity yi implies a higher job-finding rate through the informal channel of
search λi:
∂λi(µi, ai)
∂µi
< 0 lim
µi→0
λi = nvai lim
µi→1
λi = 0
Proof: Appendix II.
Based on the results from lemma 2, figure 1 shows that there is a unique intersection between
the curves µ(λi, yi) and λ(µi, ai). This implies that µi is an implicit function of the productivity
yi and the advertising intensity ai, formally (for r → 0):
µi =
δ√
(δ + λ0 + λ(µi, ai))2 + α(yi − b)cv
⇒ µi = m(yi, ai)
To analyze the intuitive implications of this relationship consider workers with a higher produc-
tivity yi. More productive workers expect to get a higher wage wi, so the gain from finding
a job is increasing in the productivity. This means that more able workers invest more effort
in writing applications and preparing for a job interview. More intensive job search through
the formal channel improves the job-finding rate vs(λi, w(yi)) and so the unemployment rate
µ(λi, yi) is reduced for every value of λi. On figure 1 this is illustrated by the left-ward shift of
the curve (UC) on the left panel. Since productivity does not enter directly into the job-finding
rate through the network, there is no shift of the curve (NC). This means that the unemploy-
ment rate is unambiguously lower in more productive worker groups. Consequently a larger
proportion of employees facilitates informal matching between open vacancies and unemployed
workers and therefore the probability of finding a job by recommendation is increasing. These
results are summarized in lemma 3:
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Lemma 3 Let r → 0. For a given advertising intensity ai, the equilibrium unemployment
rate µi = m(yi, ai) is lower in more productive worker groups. Further, for every productivity
group yi, the equilibrium unemployment rate falls with a higher search effort by firms, formally:
∂m(yi, ai)
∂yi
< 0
∂m(yi, ai)
∂ai
< 0 lim
ai→0
m(yi, ai) = lim
λi→0
µ(λi, yi) = µ¯i
Proof: Appendix III.
In addition, lemma 3 describes consequences of a higher search intensity by firms ai. If firms
exert more effort in contacting their employees, then the probability of finding a job by means
of a referral is increased for every unemployment rate µi. On figure 1 this is illustrated by the
up-ward shift of the curve (NC) on the right panel. Since advertising intensity does not enter
directly the unemployment equation, there is no shift of the curve (UC). This means that the
job finding rate λi is unambiguously higher and the equilibrium unemployment rate is reduced.
3.4 Endogenous advertising rate for referral hiring
Let us now consider the optimal behavior of a firm with an open vacancy. Apart from formal ap-
plications the firm may also fill its vacancy through the informal channel of search. In particular,
the firm should choose the optimal advertising intensity ai for every worker type yi. Intuitively,
at rate ai the firm is asking type-yi incumbent employees whether they can recommend a friend
for the open vacancy. Similarly to the effort choice of the unemployed, there is a gain and a cost
from advertising activity. The expected firm rent from contacting the incumbent employee of
type yi is equal to a(1 − (1 − µi)n)(Ji − V ), which is the probability that the job offer will be
transmitted to the unemployed worker of this type times the present value of profits. This gives
rise to the following maximization problem:
max
a
[a(1− (1− µi)n)(Ji − V )− 1
k
a2]
The optimal ai is, thus, given by:
ai = 0.5k(1− (1− µi)n)(Ji − V ) where Ji − V = (1− α)(yi − b)− rV
r + δ
(9)
This first order condition defines the level of advertising ai as a function of µi and yi, that is
ai = a(µi, yi). Therefore, for a given yi, firms exert more advertising effort if they expect a higher
proportion of unemployed workers in the network of the incumbent employee. In the following
we consider the economy in the steady-state with a free-entry of firms, which means that V = 0.
Figure 2 shows equilibrium for advertising effort and unemployment. Recall that µi = m(yi, ai)
slopes down in the space (µ, a): finding jobs becomes easier for unemployed workers if firms
increase their advertising activities. Let this curve be denoted by (MA) (see figure 2). Equation
(9) is the advertising curve and slopes up, let it be denoted by (AC). Group-specific equilibrium
(µ(yi), a(yi)) is at the intersection of the two curves and it is unique.
Next compare the equilibrium vector of variables (µ(yi), a(yi)) across different productivity
groups. On the one hand, more productive workers exert more effort in sending applications
and preparing for the job interview, so their unemployment is lower for any advertising intensity
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Figure 2: Determination of the type-specific unemployment rate µ(a, y) with the endogenous
advertising intensity of firms a(µ, y). Arrows indicate higher values of y.
ai. On figure 2 this is illustrated by the inward shift of the curve (MA). On the other hand,
for a given µi, firms expect to earn higher profits from more productive network applicants,
and so their advertising effort is higher when the firm is communicating with a more productive
incumbent employee. This implies an upward shift of the advertising curve (AC) since firms’
effort is increasing for every level of the unemployment rate µi. Considering both changes as a
combination shows that the equilibrium unemployment rate is lower in more productive worker
groups. This result is described in proposition 1:
Proposition 1: Let r → 0. (i) The group-specific equilibrium unemployment rate µi is
decreasing in the productivity yi. (ii) The job-finding rate λi and the network advertising intensity
ai are both increasing in yi if the elasticity of referral probability ρ(yi) ≡ [1− (1− µ(yi))n] with
respect to the productivity yi is less than 1, formally:
−∂ρ(yi)
∂yi
· yi − b
ρ(yi)
= −n(1− µ(yi))
n−1
1− (1− µ(yi))n ·
∂µ(yi)
∂yi
· (yi − b) < 1 (10)
Proof: Appendix IV.
Proposition 1 shows that there are two counteracting effects of yi on the network advertising
intensity a(yi). On the one hand, firms anticipate higher profits from more productive network
applicants and direct their search towards worker groups with a higher yi. But on the other
hand, the equilibrium unemployment µ(yi) is decreasing in yi which means that the average
proportion of unemployed workers in the network is lower in less productive worker groups. From
the perspective of firms this means a lower probability of referral hiring. Condition (10) then
implies that the first direct effect of higher profits is dominating if the equilibrium unemployment
rate is sufficiently inelastic.
Finally, the job-finding rate through professional contacts λ(yi) can be now rewritten as:
λ(yi) =
a(yi)v(1− µ(yi))
µ(yi)
ρ(yi) =
v(1− µ(yi))
µ(yi)
0.5kρ2(yi)J(yi) (11)
Recall that λ(yi) = λ(µ(yi), a(yi)). If the elasticity condition in proposition 1 is satisfied than
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more productive employees are more intensively approached by firms. So the probability of
finding a job through professional contacts is increasing in the productivity. In addition, since
the unemployment rate is decreasing in yi, the probability that a randomly chosen employee
is of type yi is increasing in the productivity. Both of these factors imply that the probability
of finding a job by recommendation is an increasing function of yi, that is ∂λ(yi)/∂yi > 0 if
∂a(yi)/∂yi > 0.
The primary purpose of this paper is to analyze which groups of workers are more likely to
use family and professional contacts in the process of job search. To address this question we
define the following new variables d0(yi) and d(yi). The former variable is an average proportion
of workers with productivity yi using family contacts in order to find a job. In contrast, the
latter variable is an average proportion of workers using professional contacts. This means:
d0(yi) =
λ0
λ0 + φ(yi) + λ(yi)
d(yi) =
λ(yi)
λ0 + φ(yi) + λ(yi)
The last possibility to find a job in the model is the formal channel of job search, so the
average proportion of type yi workers finding jobs by means of this channel can be found as
1 − d0(yi) − d(yi). Which worker group is relying most on family contacts? To answer this
question observe that (for r → 0):
d0(yi) =
λ0
λ0 + φ(yi) + λ(yi)
=
λ0√
(δ + λ0 + λ(yi))2 + α(yi − b)cv − δ
Therefore, d0(yi) is decreasing in yi if the elasticity condition (10) is satisfied. On the one hand,
more productive workers anticipate a larger present value of wages and exert more effort when
preparing applications and, on the other hand, firms are searching more intensively for more
productive applicants. Both of these factors imply that the proportion of workers finding jobs
through family contacts is a decreasing function of yi. In addition, observe that d0(b) = 1 (since
λ(b) = 0 and φ(b) = 0) which means that least productive workers rely exclusively on family
contacts. Finally, it is not possible to predict in general whether variable d(yi) is increasing
or decreasing in yi. We investigate this relationship numerically in section 4. In addition, our
numerical example shows that all theoretical results also hold for r 6= 0.
3.5 Wage distribution and the free-entry condition
The second purpose of our paper is to analyze the effect of referrals on wages. As mentioned
in the earlier part of our paper the equilibrium wage distribution is given by gi = ei/e and
shows the relative proportion of yi-workers in the pool of employees. So the average wage in the
economy can be found as w¯ =
∑
giwi. Next we find average wages conditional on the specific
channel of search. To do so let w¯o, w¯s and w¯n be the corresponding average wages conditional
on the search method being the family, the formal application or the network of professional
contacts. In addition, let hoi , h
s
i and h
n
i , ∀i = 1..p, be the respective wage distributions so that∑
hoi = 1,
∑
hsi = 1 and
∑
hni = 1. For example, h
s
i is the equilibrium distribution of wages
among employed workers who found a job by using the formal method of search. Each of these
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three distributions can be obtained as:
hoi =
gid0(yi)∑
gid0(yi)
hsi =
gi(1− d0(yi)− d(yi))
1−∑ gi(d0(yi) + d(yi)) hni = gid(yi)∑ gid(yi) ∀i = 1..p
Variable
∑
gid0(yi) is the proportion of employees who found a job with a help of a family
member. It is also the total measure of these workers since the total population size is normalized
to 1. In a similar way,
∑
gid(yi) is the fraction of employees who found a job with a help of
a professional contact. And the remaining part 1 −∑ gi(d0(yi) + d(yi)) is the proportion of
workers who found a job through the formal method of search. Therefore, the three average
wages for each of the search channels can be found as:
w¯o =
∑
wih
o
i w¯
s =
∑
wih
s
i w¯
n =
∑
wih
n
i
These equations allow us to compare the average wages w¯o, w¯s and w¯n and to predict whether
family and/or professional referrals are associated with a wage premium or a wage penalty rela-
tive to the formal method. Either of these results will depend on the self-selection of workers into
the specific channels of search. For example, we expect that family contacts will be associated
with a wage penalty as this search channel is the most prevalent among the groups of workers
with low wages. Formally, one can show that family contacts are associated with a wage penalty
if the distribution hsi first order stochastically dominates the distribution h
o
i :
w¯o =
p∑
i=1
wih
o
i = w1 +
p−1∑
i=1
∆wi(1−Hoi ) and w¯s =
p∑
i=1
wih
s
i = w1 +
p−1∑
i=1
∆wi(1−Hsi )
so that w¯o < w¯s if Hsi ≤ Hoi , ∀i = 1..p
where ∆wi = wi+1 − wi > 0 since the wage is an increasing function of the productivity,
and variables Hoi , H
s
i are the cumulative density functions so that H
o
i =
∑i
j=1 h
o
j and H
s
i =∑i
j=1 h
s
j . The proof is presented in appendix V. In a similar way, define H
n
i =
∑i
j=1 h
n
j to be
the cumulative density function of wages obtained with a help of professional contacts. This
channel of search is then associated with a wage premium relative to the formal method, i.e
w¯s < w¯n, if the distribution hni first order stochastically dominates the distribution h
s
i , which is
equivalent to Hni ≤ Hsi , ∀i = 1..p. Intuitively, this condition holds when firms rely on professional
recommendations to match with high ability workers, which is the case in our model.
Finally, the last component of the model is the Bellman equation for an open vacancy with
a present value denoted by V . Same as workers firms are simultaneously using each of the three
search channels to fill an open vacancy. At rate λ0ui/v the firm is matched with an unemployed
worker of type yi as a consequence of a family referral and at rate φ(si)ui/v = siui the firm is
matched with a similar worker by means of a formal application. Note that a higher measure
of unemployed workers with the productivity yi and a more intensive job search si increase the
probability of filling a vacancy with this type of worker. In addition, firms may contact one of
the incumbent employees to ask for the referral. An applicant of type yi is hired through this
channel with a job-filling rate aiuiρi, where we use notation ρi = ρ(yi) = [1− (1−µ(yi))n]. This
latter term is the probability that the contacted employee will recommend an applicant for the
15
open position. Thus, the value of an open vacancy is given by:
rV = −z + λ0
v
∑
ui(Ji − V ) +
∑
siui(Ji − V ) +
∑
ei
(
aiρi(J(yi)− V )− a2i /k
)
(12)
where z is the flow cost of filling a vacancy which is independent of a specific search channel. The
free-entry condition of firms implies that V = 0 in the steady-state equilibrium. Substituting
the present value of profits Ji and the optimal advertising intensity ai gives us the equilibrium
number of vacancies:
v = λ0
1− α
r + δ
∑
ui(yi − b)
[
z − 1− α
r + δ
∑
siui(yi − b)− 0.25k (1− α)
2
(r + δ)2
∑
eiρ
2
i (yi − b)2
]−1
This is the last equilibrium equation. So the equilibrium can be defined in the following way:
Definition 1. Search equilibrium is a vector of variables (Ui, Wi, Ji, wi, si, ai, µi), ∀i = 1..p
as well as the number of vacancies v and the present value of an open vacancy V , satisfying
the asset value equations for workers (1) and (3), for firms (5) and (12), the wage equations
wi = αyi + (1 − α)b, the optimal effort equations (4) and (9), the stationary unemployment
conditions (7) and the free-entry condition V = 0.
In the next section we continue analyzing the model in a standard numerical example.
4 Numerical example
4.1 Search effort and the equilibrium unemployment curve
This section parameterizes the model to match the average labour market indicators in the
OECD countries. We choose a unit period of time to be six months and set r = 0.01 which
corresponds to the annual discount rate of 2%. Further, we follow Shimer (2005) and set the
unemployment benefit b equal to 0.4. Fontaine (2008) uses the value of 0.15 for the U.S. economy
and 0.4 for the French economy. Gautier (2002) and Cahuc and Fontaine (2009) set b equal to
0.2. At the same time, Hall and Milgrom (2008) obtain a larger value of 0.71. Therefore, our
choice of b is in the middle range of the typical values in the literature.
Given b = 0.4, the range of productivities in the model becomes [0.4..1]. Since education
is one of the main components of the productivity, in the following we will interpret the least
productive group of workers (with y1 = 0.4) as those who have completed compulsory education.
At the same time the most productive group of workers with y25 = 1 will be interpreted as those
who have already completed a doctoral degree. The education difference between these two
groups is equal to 12 years, including 4 years in the high school, 5 years in the college/university
and 3 years for obtaining a doctoral degree. Given that in the model one period of time is equal
to one semester, this gives us 2 · 12 + 1 educational groups, so we set p = 25. The productivity
gap between the two consequent worker groups is then equal to 0.0253.
3The choice of p is not essential for the model since neither of the group-specific variables depends on the total
number of productivity groups. Nevertheless, with a large value of p the model can serve as an approximation of
the market with a continuous productivity distribution and allows an intuitive interpretation of worker groups as
those with different levels of educational attainment.
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Next, we take the value of the separation rate δ = 0.15 which corresponds to the average job
duration of 1/(2 · 0.15) = 3.3 years. Pissarides (2009) and Shimer (2005) choose the value of δ
equal to 0.1 with one unit of time being a quarter. This corresponds to the average job duration
of 1/(4 · 0.1) = 2.5 years. Hall and Milgrom (2008) choose the value of 3% per month, so the
average job duration in their model is 1/(12 · 0.03) = 2.78 years. Hobijn und Sahin (2009),
however, when estimating the montly job separation rate for OECD countries for the period
1968-2004 report to be at most 2.3% (Spain). So the average job duration is 1/(12∗0.023) = 3.6
years. Therefore, our estimate falls within the standard bounds.
The job-finding rate through the channel of family contacts λ0 is chosen to be 0.3 and is
defined by the unemployment rate of the least productive workers being equal to µ(b) = δ/(δ +
λ0) = 0.33. Note that the productivity of these workers is equal to the unemployment benefit
and so the gain from finding a job is zero, which means that sending formal job applications is
too costly for this group of workers. At the same time, w(b) = b so firms obtain zero profits
from hiring the least productive workers. Therefore, it is not profitable for firms to direct their
search towards these employees. Hence, the only way for the unproductive workers to find a job
is to rely on family contacts. For this reason the average unemployment duration of this group
of workers is equal to 1.6 years and is the largest in the population.
We choose the number of workers’ professional contacts equal to 50 as in Cahuc and Fontaine
(2009), while Fontaine (2008) uses n = 40 in a benchmark model of his paper. These numbers
are in line with the empirical evidence, for example, in their recent study Cingano and Rosolia
(2012) find that the median number of professional contacts in Italy is equal to 32. This number
is higher in Germany and is equal to 43 according to Glitz (2013). The workers’ bargaining
power α is set equal to 0.72 as in Shimer (2005). This means that the maximum wage in the
economy is equal to 0.72 ·1+(1−0.72) ·0.4 = 0.832. With this parameter choice we can calculate
the annual return to schooling which is implied by the model: ln(0.83/0.4)/12 = 0.061, so the
average salary increase for an additional year of education is equal to 6.1%. This value is in line
with the parameters presented in Card (2001).
An important feature of our model is its invariance to the shape of the productivity dis-
tribution and the number of vacancies. Recall that the two key variables in the model d0(yi)
and d(yi) correspond to the relative fractions of workers finding jobs with a help of family and
professional contacts. Thus these variables are defined in relative terms and are independent
of the productivity distribution fi. Moreover, the total number of vacancies only enters in the
two multiplicative terms kv and cv, where k and c are the unobservable parameters of the two
cost functions. To identify variables kv and cv, first, we define a median productivity group.
According to the OECD report 2013 (table A1.1a), 47% of workers aged 25-64 in the US report
the high school diploma to be the maximum educational achievement. Further, there is a small
proportion of workers equal to 11% who did not complete their high school studies. Therefore,
we can conclude that 58% of workers in the US have at most a high school diploma. In the model
this corresponds to the productivity level y8 = 0.575 (8 semesters of schooling). So a median
worker in the US has the level of schooling just below the high school. Based on this information
we conjecture that a median worker in our model should have the productivity y7 = 0.55.
In the second step, having defined a median worker group, we simultaneously choose variables
kv and cv to target d0(y7) + d(y7) = 0.4 and µ(y7) = 0.087. The first of these conditions implies
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that 40% of workers in the median group find employment by means of referrals. This assumption
is in line with the empirical observation that 30% to 60% of the employees in developed countries
rely on social contacts in order to find a job (see Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004) for an
overview). The second condition implies that the unemployment rate in the median group of
workers is equal to 8.7%. This number is the average unemployment rate in the United States
in the recent years (BLS, 2009-2013). Our calibration strategy yields kv = 0.24 and cv = 22.07.
Table 1 presents our calibration for the benchmark case.
Variable Value Explanation, source and target
n 50 Network size (Cahuc and Fontaine (2009))
r 0.01 Annual interest rate of 2%
λ0 0.3 Unemployment of the least able worker=33%
δ 0.15 Average job duration of 3.3 years
α 0.72 Worker’s bargaining power (Shimer (2005))
b 0.4 Unemployment benefit (Shimer (2005))
p 25 Number of productivity types
cv 22.07 Unemployment of the median worker=8.7%
kv 0.24 Referral hiring of the median worker=40%
Table 1: Values of the model parameters
Next we describe our results. Figure 3 (left panel) presents variables d0(yi), 1−d0(yi)−d(yi)
and d(yi) for every worker group i = 1..25. These are the average proportions of workers
finding employment by means of family contacts, formal applications and professional contacts
respectively. As we proved in the theoretical part of the paper the average fraction of workers
using family contacts to find a job, d0(yi), is a decreasing curve and the lowest productivity group
never finds jobs through channels other than family contacts. Therefore, the reliance on family
contacts falls down from 100% for the least able workers to only 7% for the most productive
group. Intuitively, even though family contacts become less important for more productive
workers, our model does not exclude situations when talented employees are recommended and
work for the same employer as their parents.
Now consider professional relations. Figure 4 (the right panel) shows that firms exert more
advertising effort a(yi) when targeting the more productive group of incumbent employees. This
means that the elasticity condition in proposition 1 is satisfied and the positive effect of higher
profits is dominating for firms. This in turn implies that the job finding rate λ(yi) is an increasing
function of productivity. On the one hand, even if firms contacted their incumbent employees
in a random and undirected manner they would be more likely to be in contact with a more
productive worker as the equilibrium unemployment rate is decreasing with yi (see the right panel
of figure 4). On the other hand, it is profitable for firms to direct their search towards the more
productive group of incumbent employees in the expectation of a good applicant. Therefore,
both effects are reinforcing and amplifying each other and the network job-finding rate λ(yi)
is an increasing and a convex function of yi (see the left panel of figure 4). Thus the average
proportion of workers using professional contacts to find a job, d(yi) is increasing from 0% for
the least productive group up to 60% for the most productive group. Moreover, the network of
professional contacts is a dominating channel of search for workers with a productivity above
y15 = 0.75.
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Figure 3: Left panel: The graph for average proportions of workers using family (black), pro-
fessional (blue) contacts and the formal application (red) in the job search process for different
productivity levels. Right panel: The graph for the average proportions of workers using social
contacts in the job search for different productivity levels (U-shape).
Finally, consider the formal applications channel. Figure 3 (left panel) shows that the rel-
ative fraction of workers finding jobs through this channel, 1 − d0(yi) − d(yi) is increasing for
productivities below y5 = 0.5 and decreasing thereafter. Intuitively, for the less able workers
the probability of being referred for a job λ(yi) is still relatively low, but the wage wi is already
sufficiently large to motivate these workers for preparing formal applications. However, as the
productivity is increasing, workers’ chances of being referred for a job are improving and the
incentives to invest costly effort and time in preparing applications are mitigated. In line with
this reasoning figure 4 (left panel) shows that the search effort s(wi, λi) is an increasing but
a concave function of yi as the positive effect of a higher wage is partially neutralized by the
negative effect of a higher λi. In addition, figure 3 (left panel) illustrates that the formal channel
of search is dominating for workers in the middle range of productivities between y2 = 0.425
and y15 = 0.75 reaching a maximum of 62% for workers with a productivity y5 = 0.5.
To sum up, our model is able to jointly replicate a number of empirical observations. First,
without separating social contacts into different types the model shows that the reliance on social
contacts d0(yi)+d(yi) has a distinct U-shape pattern falling down from 100% to 38% for workers
with y5 = 0.5 and rising again to the level of 67% for the most productive workers (see figure 3
(right panel)). Second, when the two types of contacts are separated, then family contacts are
more likely to have a negative effect on wages since family referrals are strongly biased towards
the left tail of the productivity distribution. In contrast, professional contacts are more likely
to have a positive effect on wages since these contacts are biased towards the right tail of the
distribution. However, the overall effect of referrals on wages is ambiguous and depends on the
exact proportions of high and low types in the population. Therefore, we continue the analysis
of wages by considering an explicit shape of the productivity distribution fi.
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Figure 4: Left panel: The graphs for λ0 (black), φ(s(yi)) (red) and for λ(yi) (blue) for different
productivity levels. Right panel: The optimal advertising rate a(yi) by firms (dashed) and the
graph for the unemployment rate µ(yi) (solid) for different productivity levels.
4.2 Wage and productivity distributions
It is a well documented empirical fact (see Neal and Rosen (2000) and Mortensen (2003)) that
a typical earnings distribution is hump-shaped and positively skewed with a mean value larger
than the median. Therefore, it is often well approximated by the log-normal distribution. In our
model the distribution fi is discrete, so we use the Negative Binomial productivity distribution
which is a discrete counterpart of the log-normal distribution. In particular, we rely on a special
case of the density which is known as the Polya distribution. Given that this distribution has
an infinite range we truncate it at i = 25. The productivity density fi is then characterized by
two parameters t and pi and takes the form:
fi =
f˜i∑25
i=1 f˜i
where f˜i =
( i+ t− 2
i− 1
)
(1− pi)tpii−1 = Γ(i+ t− 1)
(i− 1)!Γ(t) (1− pi)
tpii−1, i = 1, 2, ...
Negative Binomial a discrete probability distribution of the number of successes in a sequence
of independent and identically distributed Bernoulli trials before a specified number of failures
occurs. Here t is the specified number of failures and pi is the probability of success. However, in
the specific case of Polya distribution t is a real-valued parameter rather than an integer, which
allows a more accurate approximation of the data. To identify parameters t and pi we exploit
the definition of the median worker having the productivity y7 = 0.55 and the fact that 58% of
workers in the U.S. have at most a high school degree (corresponding to y8 = 0.575), mentioned
above. Therefore, we set
∑7
i=1 fi = 0.5 and
∑8
i=1 fi = 0.58.
Next, we consider the free-entry condition. To identify the cost of an open vacancy z we
set the market tightness v/u equal to 1, where u =
∑p
i=1 µifi is the equilibrium unemployment
rate in the economy. This value coincides with the calibration of Shimer (2005) but it is larger
than 0.72 chosen by Pissarides (2009) and derived from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover
Survey (JOLTS). To defend our choice we argue that some vacancies are not captured by JOLTS,
for example, some positions are filled without ever reporting a vacancy. In particular, these
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positions are very likely to be filled through social networks and, therefore, we consider the
market tightness equal to 1 an appropriate choice for our model. The last set of parameters is
presented in table 2:
Variable Value Explanation, source and target
t 2.98 58% have at most a high school degree (y8 = 0.575) (OECD (2013))
pi 0.717 Productivity of a median worker y7 = 0.55
z 0.390 Market tightness equal to 1 (Shimer (2005))
Table 2: Values of the model parameters
We get z = 0.39 (flow cost of an open vacancy) in equilibrium, which is close to the value
of 0.4 chosen for the formal search method by Cahuc and Fontaine (2009). Shimer (2005) has
chosen the value of 0.213 for this parameter, while Fontaine (2008) uses the number 0.3. The
choice of Pissarides (2009) is closer to our value, in his calibration the cost of an open vacancy is
equal to 0.36. Another influential calibration is due to Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). These
authors find that the capital cost of an open vacancy is equal to 0.47 and the personnel cost is
0.11, which gives a value 0.58. Hence, z = 0.39 is in the middle range of standard values.
The productivity density function fi with t = 2.98 and pi = 0.717 is illustrated by the solid
curve on figure 5 (left panel). The equilibrium wage distribution gi , defined in the theoretical
part of the paper, is shown by the dashed curve on the same figure. The corresponding CDFs are
shown on figure 5 (right panel). The wage distribution gi first order stochastically dominates the
productivity distribution fi. This is because the unemployment rate is higher than the average
among the less productive types and lower among the more productive. Both distributions are,
however, very close to each other.
Figure 5: Left panel: The graphs for the probability mass functions of the Negative Binomial dis-
tribution (solid) and of the equilibrium wage distribution (dashed). Right panel: The graphs for
the CDFs of the Negative Binomial distribution (solid) and of the equilibrium wage distribution
(dashed).
The equilibrium wage/productivity distributions conditional on the job search channel hoi
(black), hsi (red) and h
n
i (blue), as well as their corresponding CDFs are presented on figure
6. The wage distribution of workers finding jobs through their families, hoi , is first order
stochastically dominated by the wage distribution of employees who used a formal application,
hsi . The probability mass of the distribution h
o
i is mostly concentrated in the lower productivity
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range and so most of the employees in this group are the low productivity types with low wages.
The average productivity of workers using the family channel is equal to 0.536 and the average
wage is w¯o = 0.498. In contrast, the average productivity of workers using the formal channel
is equal to 0.580 and the average wage is w¯s = 0.530. Therefore, we conclude that the family
search channel is associated with a wage penalty of 6% compared to the formal channel.
Figure 6: Left panel: The graphs for wage distribution functions hoi (black), h
s
i (red) and for h
n
i
(blue) corresponding to different channels of job search. Right panel: The graphs for cumulative
wage distribution functions H0i (black), H
s
i (red) and for H
n
i (blue)
The second distribution, hsi , is in turn first order stochastically dominated by the wage
distribution of workers who used professional contacts, hni . Here the average productivity is
equal to 0.656 and the average wage is w¯n = 0.584 (see table 3). The probability mass of the
distribution hni is shifted to the right and so this density is mostly concentrated in the middle
range of the productivities. This is due to the fact that the proportion of high productivity
workers in the population is relatively low and almost all of them are employed. Finally, observe
that finding a job with a help of professional contacts is associated with a wage premium of
10%. Therefore, we can rank w¯o < w¯s < w¯n, which is the second prediction of the paper: when
the two types of contacts are separated, then family contacts are more likely to have a negative
effect on wages, whereas professional contacts are more likely to have a positive effect. Capellari
and Tatsiramos (2013) confirm this result with their empirical finding for the UK that high-
skilled individuals, whose employed friends are non-relatives, earn higher wages and low-skilled
individuals, whose employed friends are relatives, experience a wage penalty. Sylos Labini (2004)
confirm this finding for Italy.
Specific search channel
Variable Family Formal Professional All channels
Average productivity 0.536 0.580 0.656 0.590
Average wage 0.498 0.530 0.584 0.536
Proportion of employees 0.213 0.541 0.247 1
Table 3: Model-generated statistics for the benchmark calibration
Based on table 3 we can also calculate the average wage of employees who found a job by
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means of referrals, i.e. both types of social contacts. Let this variable be denoted by w¯c:
w¯c =
w¯o
∑
gid0(yi) + w¯
n
∑
gid(yi)∑
gid0(yi) +
∑
gid(yi)
=
0.498 · 0.213 + 0.584 · 0.247
0.213 + 0.247
= 0.544
w¯c = 0.544 is higher than w¯s = 0.530. Thus, in the benchmark case the positive effect of
professional networks is dominating the negative effect of family contacts and job referrals are
associated with a wage premium of 2.6%. However, this result is sensitive to the relative pro-
portions of workers relying on family and professional relations. To elaborate on this point we
perform comparative statics analysis with respect to parameter t which is a shift parameter
of the distribution. Intuitively, a lower value of t corresponds to labour markets with a larger
proportion of low skilled workers. In the first step, we find t∗ for the neutral scenario when
the effect of referrals on wages is zero. Other parameters remain unchanged. We get the value
t∗ = 2.21. Our results for the neutral scenario are presented in table 4. In the second step, we
recognize that the effect of referrals should be negative for t < t∗. Therefore, we consider a wage
penalty scenario as a symmetric case around t∗: t = 1.45 = 2.21 − (2.98 − 2.21), substracting
from t∗ the difference between the benchmark value of t = 2.98 and t∗. Our results for the wage
penalty scenario (t = 1.45) are presented in table 5:
Specific search channel
Variable Family Formal Professional All channels
Average productivity 0.493 0.545 0.617 0.545
Average wage 0.467 0.504 0.556 0.504
Proportion of employees 0.270 0.538 0.193 1
Table 4: Model-generated statistics with t = 2.21
Specific search channel
Variable Family Formal Professional All channels
Average productivity 0.454 0.511 0.575 0.498
Average wage 0.439 0.480 0.526 0.471
Proportion of employees 0.371 0.496 0.134 1
Table 5: Model-generated statistics with t = 1.45
The productivity density function fi and the equilibrium wage distribution gi for the neutral
scenario (t = 2.21) are illustrated by the solid and dashed curves on figure 7 (left panel). fi in this
case is close to our benchmark productivity distribution, although shifted to the left. Compared
to the benchmark scenario, more workers are relying on their families in the job search process
(0.270 > 0.231) and less workers find jobs by means of professional contacts (0.193 < 0.247).
From table 4 we also see that family contacts have a negative effect of wages, whereas professional
contacts are associated with a wage premium: w¯o = 0.467 < w¯s = 0.504 < w¯n = 0.556.
Therefore, we conclude that these results are due to the self-selection of workers into channels
and are robust to different specifications of the productivity distribution. The average referral
wage for this case can be calculated from table 4:
w¯c =
0.467 · 0.270 + 0.556 · 0.193
0.270 + 0.193
= 0.504
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This value is equal to w¯s and so the average effect of referrals on wages is equal to zero.
Figure 7: Left panel: The graphs for the probability mass functions of the Negative Binomial
distribution (solid) and the equilibrium wage distribution (dashed) for t = 2.21. Right panel:
The graphs for the probability mass functions of the Negative Binomial distribution (solid) and
the equilibrium wage distribution (dashed) for t = 1.45.
The productivity density function fi and the equilibrium wage distribution gi for the wage
penalty scenario (t = 1.45) are illustrated by the solid and dashed curves on the right panel of
figure 7. This scenario is associated with a further increase in the proportion of workers relying
on families (0.371 > 0.270) and a lower importance of professional contacts (0.134 < 0.193).
As before, table 5 confirms that family contacts are associated with a wage penalty, whereas
professional networks with wage premium, since w¯o = 0.439 < w¯s = 0.480 < w¯n = 0.526. The
average referral wage can be calculated from table 5:
w¯c =
0.439 · 0.371 + 0.526 · 0.134
0.371 + 0.134
= 0.462
This value is lower than 0.480 = w¯s and so there is a wage penalty equal to 1.9%.
This section shows that the negative effect of family contacts and the positive effect of
professional contacts are both robust to the exact specification of the productivity distribution
in the population. However, the average effect of referrals on wages is sensitive to the specific
distribution and can be positive or negative depending on the relative proportions of high and
low productivity groups. Thus, our model provides and additional explanation for the ambiguous
results reported in the empirical literature, which were summarized in the introduction.
5 Conclusions
This paper develops a labour market matching model with a finite number of heterogeneous
worker groups and three channels of job search: family contacts, formal applications and profes-
sional contacts. Moreover, the model relies on the assumption of network homophily meaning
that workers connected in the network are all of the same ability/productivity type. In this
framework, we are able to generate a significant U-shape relationship between the frequency of
referral hiring and the productivity/skill level of the worker.
Family contacts are exogenous in the model and serve as a residual method of search. Nev-
ertheless, every worker may choose an endogenous search intensity, which can be interpreted as
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a total effort and time invested in preparing job applications. It turns out that the gain from
preparing applications is increasing in the worker type and so it is relatively costly for low pro-
ductivity workers to rely on the formal channel. On the other hand, firms with open vacancies
direct their network search towards more productive incumbent employees in the anticipation
of higher profits. Therefore, the family channel of search is predominantly employed by workers
in the left tail of the productivity distribution, whereas the network of professional contacts is
largely used by more productive workers. These two mechanisms explain the U-shaped referral
hiring pattern. Moreover, this relationship is invariant to the exact shape of the productivity
distribution, which is an indicator for the robustness of our result.
In addition, the U-shaped employment pattern implies that the effect of professional (family)
contacts on wages is positive (negative) with respect to the formal channel. This result is due
to the endogenous sorting of workers across the channels and is robust to the exact shape of the
productivity density. However, the average effect of referrals on wages is ambiguous and depends
on the relative proportions of high and low ability workers in the population. We believe these
results shed some light on the contradicting empirical evidence and may serve as a further step
in the explanation of the ”referral puzzle”, at least from a theoretical perspective.
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7 Appendix
Appendix I. Proof of Lemma 1:
The rent Ri can be obtained as a solution of the following quadratic equation:
0.25cvR2i + (r + δ + λ0 + λi)Ri − (wi − b) = 0
Since workers will only accept the job with Ri ≥ 0 it holds that:
Ri =
2
cv
[
√
(r + δ + λ0 + λ(yi))2 + (wi − b)cv − (r + δ + λ0 + λi)]
therefore the optimal effort is given by si = 0.5cRi, where Ri is increasing in the wage wi but
decreasing in λi:
∂Ri
∂λi
=
2
cv
[√ (r + δ + λ0 + λi)2
(r + δ + λ0 + λi)2 + (wi − b)cv − 1
]
< 0
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Appendix II. Proof of Lemma 2:
Differentiate λi with respect to µi for a given fixed advertising intensity ai:
∂λ(µi, ai)
∂µi
= vai
[
− 1
µ2i
[1− (1− µi)n] + 1− µi
µi
n(1− µi)n−1
]
=
vai
µ2i
[
−1 + (1− µi)n + nµi(1− µi)n
]
=
vai
µ2i
[(1− µi)n(nµi + 1)− 1]
Let σ(µ) denote the first term in the square bracket (suppressing the subindex), i.e. σ(µ) =
(1− µ)n(nµ+ 1). Note that σ(0) = 1 and σ(1) = 0. Moreover, σ(µ) is a decreasing function of
µ for 0 < µ < 1:
∂σ
∂µ
= −n(1− µ)n−1(nµ+ 1− µ+ µ) + (1− µ)nn
= n[−(1− µ)n − (1− µ)n−1µ(n+ 1) + (1− µ)n] = −n(1− µ)n−1µ(n+ 1) < 0
This proves that σ(µ) = (1− µ)n(nµ+ 1) < 1 and, therefore, ∂λ(µi, ai)/∂µi < 0 for 0 < µ < 1.
Next, applying the L’Hopital’s rule one can show that:
lim
µi→0
λi = vai
limµi→0(1− (1− µi)n)
limµi→0 µi
= vai lim
µi→0
n(1− µi)n−1 = nvai
and also limµi→1 λi = 0. This completes the proof of lemma 2.
Appendix III: Proof of Lemma 3
First, note that at the intersection between the curves µ(λ, y) and λ(µ, a) (see figure), the latter
curve (NC) is flatter than the former curve (UC), this means:
0 >
∂λ(µ, a)
∂µ
>
[∂µ(λ, y)
∂λ
]−1 ⇒ 0 < ∂λ(µ, a)
∂µ
· ∂µ(λ, y)
∂λ
< 1
Taking a total derivative of µ(λ, y) with respect to y yields the following:
dµ =
∂µ(λ, y)
∂λ
dλ+
∂µ(λ, y)
∂y
dy and dλ =
∂λ(µ, a)
∂µ
dµ
Therefore, we get the following result:
∂m(y, a)
∂y
=
dµ
dy
=
∂µ(λ, y)
∂y
[
1− ∂µ(λ, y)
∂λ
· ∂λ(µ, a)
∂µ
]−1
< 0
since ∂µ(λ, y)/∂y < 0 and expression in the square bracket is positive. Similarly, we can show
that ∂m(y, a)/∂a < 0.
Appendix IV. Proof of Proposition 1:
(i) First, note the following results from before:
∂m(y, a)
∂y
< 0
∂m(y, a)
∂a
< 0
∂a(m, y)
∂m
> 0
∂a(m, y)
∂y
> 0
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Taking a total derivative of m(a, y) with respect to y yields the following:
dm =
∂m(y, a)
∂y
dy +
∂m(y, a)
∂a
da
=
∂m(y, a)
∂y
dy +
∂m(y, a)
∂a
[∂a(m, y)
∂m
dm+
∂a(m, y)
∂y
dy
]
dm
[
1− ∂m(y, a)
∂a
∂a(m, y)
∂m
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
=
[∂m(y, a)
∂y
+
∂m(y, a)
∂a
∂a(m, y)
∂y
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
dy ⇒ dm
dy
< 0
(ii) Let ρ(yi) ≡ [1− (1− µ(yi))n] denote the probability of a referral, it then holds that a(yi) =
0.5kρ(yi)J(yi), where J(yi) = (1−α)(yi− b)/(r+ δ) given the free-entry condition V = 0. Next
differentiate a(yi) with respect to yi to obtain:
∂a(yi)
∂yi
=
∂ρ(yi)
∂yi
J(yi) + ρ(yi)
∂J(yi)
∂yi
=
∂ρ(yi)
∂yi
(1− α)(yi − b)
r + δ
+ ρ(yi)
(1− α)
r + δ
Therefore,
∂a(yi)
∂yi
> 0 if
∂ρ(yi)
∂yi
· yi − b
ρ(yi)
> −1
Appendix V. Suppose the distribution hsi first order stochastically dominates the distribution
h0i , then it holds H
s
i ≤ Hoi , ∀i = 1..p. The average wage w¯o can be written as:
w¯o =
p∑
i=1
wih
o
i = w1h
o
1 + w2h
o
2 + w3h
o
3 + ...+ wp−1h
o
p−1 + wph
o
p
= w1(h
o
1 + h
o
2 + ...+ h
o
p) + (w2 − w1)(ho2 + ...+ hop) + ...+ (wp − wp−1)hop
= w1 +
p−1∑
i=1
(wi+1 − wi)
p∑
j=i+1
hoj = w1 +
p−1∑
i=1
(wi+1 − wi)(1−
i∑
j=1
hoj)
= w1 +
p−1∑
i=1
(wi+1 − wi)(1−Hoi )
In a similar way, one can derive an equation for w¯s. So that w¯o < w¯s if Hsi ≤ Hoi , ∀i = 1..p.
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